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El presente documento examina aspectos teóricos y prácticos de las numerosas políticas monetarias 
no convencionales que se han implementado desde la crisis de 2008-2009. En términos teóricos, 
comenzamos por revisar el rol de la credibilidad en la adopción de metas inflacionarias cuando la 
tasa de interés nominal ya está en su límite inferior, prestando especial atención a la importancia del 
balance contable del banco central. Además, presentamos un modelo cuyo rasgo principal es una 
imperfección financiera que subraya el rol del capital del banco, así como la relevancia de políticas 
crediticias alternativas que se pueden utilizar durante una crisis financiera. Por otro lado, 
analizamos la evidencia de la experiencia reciente. En particular, nos centramos en el tipo de de 
políticas no convencionales que se han utilizado y la oportunidad de su aplicación. Luego 
exploramos medidas alternativas para evaluar la expansividad de la política monetaria en una 
situación en la que la tasa de política ya ha sido llevada a su mínimo posible. Finalmente, 
presentamos evidencia descriptiva sobre la forma en que las políticas adoptadas afectaron la forma 





This paper discusses theoretical and practical aspects of the various unconventional central bank 
policies during the 2008-2009 crisis. In terms of theory, we first discuss the role of credibility in the 
attainment of inflationary goals once the nominal interest rate is at a lower bound, paying particular 
attention to the role of the central bank’s balance sheet. Additionally, we present a model which has 
at its core a financial imperfection that highlights the role of bank’s capital as well as the relevance 
of alternative credit policies that can be used to deal with financial distress. On the other hand, we 
review evidence regarding the recent experience. We discuss the timing and type of observed 
unconventional policies.  We then explore alternative measures to assess the stance of monetary 
policy in a situation when the policy rate has reached its lower bound. Finally, we present some 
descriptive evidence on the effect of the applied policies on the shape of the yield curve and the 
lending-deposit spread. 
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In response to the current global crisis, the US Federal Reserve and other central 
banks around the world have implemented diverse policy measures, including purchasing a 
wide range of securities, lending to financial institutions, intervening exchange rates, and 
paying interest on reserves. Some central banks have also reduced monetary policy interest 
rates to minimum levels (lower bound) and have announced an explicit commitment to keep 
interest rates there for a prolonged period. This set of instruments contrasts with a 
conventional view, embedded in the predominant monetary policy models, within which a 
central bank controls only a short-term interest rate, such as the Federal Funds rate. 
Some of the previous actions may be classified as responses to increasing demand for 
liquidity in a context of enormous financial uncertainty. An example of this liquidity provision 
by central banks is repo operations to provide US dollar liquidity in many economies, in the 
period around the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Other actions may be sorted into those 
attempting to deal with malfunctioning financial markets (insufficient lending to non-financial 
firms or high lending spreads) and those attempting to enhance the monetary policy stimulus 
under the lower-bound constraint. 
This paper discusses the theoretical and practical aspects of these heterodox policies. In 
terms of theory, the paper focuses on the two alternative arguments that have been offered to 
rationalize such policies: the desirability of further monetary stimulus when interest rates are 
already at zero and the need to unlock financially intermediated credit, when it freezes in a 
crisis. On the first argument, we provide a framework to analyze the theoretical mechanisms 
through which quantitative easing may be effective to deal with the lower bound constraint. 
We then show that the effectiveness of such unconventional policies depends crucially on the 
central bank’s ability to commit to future policy, in line with Krugman (1998). Regarding the 
second argument, we present a model that helps us to introduce a role for unconventional 
monetary policy, in the context of non-trivial financial intermediation. We then argue that the 
introduction of financial intermediaries in standard models produces results that challenge 
conventional wisdom about the effects of non-conventional policies. 
In terms of recent practice, we provide evidence arising from the recent experience of 
central banks that have implemented inflation targets as part of conducting monetary policy. 
We associate the different monetary policy actions with different phases of the recent financial 
crisis and with different objectives. In our analysis we focus on evaluating efforts to increase 
monetary policy stimulus and deal with disrupted financial markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a theoretical discussion 
of two relevant issues that have been at center stage in both policy and academic discussions 
about unconventional policies during the current crisis: the role of credibility and the 
importance of financial frictions and bank capital. Section 2 provides a more empirically 
oriented account of recent events. We first discuss the timing and the type of unconventional 
policies that have been implemented. We then compare several alternative measures that can 
be used to assess the monetary policy approach, particularly when the policy rate has reached 
its lower bound. Finally, we provide descriptive evidence on the effects of these policies on the 
shape of the yield curve and the lending-deposit spreads. Section 3 concludes. 
 
1.  Rationalizing Heterodox Monetary Policy 
 
1.1  Monetary Policy at the Edge: The Role of Credibility 
 
One often mentioned justification for unconventional monetary policy is that the usual 
monetary instrument, the control of an overnight interest rate in the interbank market, may 
have reached a limit. In particular, this is the case when a monetary stimulus is deemed to be 
desirable but the policy rate is a nominal one that cannot be pushed below zero (or a value 
  1slightly greater than zero). If the policy rate is already at or close to the lower bound, the 
central bank must look for alternatives to provide monetary stimulus. 
Clearly, the current crisis has brought several countries to a situation in which policy 
interest rates are close to zero, but expansionary policy appears warranted. Much less clear, 
however, is whether that fact is sufficient to justify the kind of unconventional policies that we 
have observed in practice. Can one appeal to the zero lower bound problem to rationalize, for 
example, the striking expansion in the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and the 
c h a n g e s  i n  i t s  c o m p o s i t i o n ?  H e r e  w e  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  a n s w e r  c a n  b e  p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e ,  
depending on the policy environment and, above all, on the central bank’s ability to commit to 
future policy. 
The starting point of our argument is the observation that currently accepted 
macroeconomic theory implies that the zero bound on interest rates will rarely, if ever, be a 
truly binding constraint for a central bank that can perfectly commit to future policy. Recent 
theories emphasize that a central bank can affect economic decisions not only through the 
current setting of its policy instrument (e.g. today’s interest rate) but also, and perhaps much 
more effectively, through its impact on the public’s expectations regarding the future settings 
of the instrument. The corollary is that the central bank can always provide some stimulus to 
the economy, even if the policy rate is at the zero bound, by committing to reducing future 
policy rates below levels previously expected (which is feasible if the policy rate was expected to 
be positive at some point in the future). 
Thus, for example, Bernanke and Reinhart (2004, p. 85) argue that one of the strategies 
available for “stimulating the economy that do not involve changing the current value of the 
policy rate...[is] providing assurance to financial investors that short rates will be lower in the 
future than they currently expect”. The same argument has been embraced recently by the 
European Central Bank (Bini Smaghi 2009), the Bank of Canada (Murray 2009), and others. In 
fact, even Krugman’s (1998) pioneering discussion of Japan implied that the Bank of Japan 
could have escaped the liquidity trap there, by promising to keep interest rates sufficiently low 
for some period, even after inflation had become positive (see also Svensson 2003). 
In short, the zero lower bound on interest rates is unlikely to be a serious constraint on 
a central bank that can precommit policy. One could conjecture, however, that unconventional 
policies such as “quantitative easing” or “credit easing” may be still be useful to complement 
conventional policy. It is somewhat surprising, however, to realize that that conjecture is quite 
unlikely to hold. 
This key point has been developed most convincingly by Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2003). They show that, once a strategy for setting current and future policy rates is in place 
(for example, using a Taylor-type rule), real allocations and asset prices become independent of 
whatever the central bank does with the composition or size of its balance sheet, in periods in 
which the policy rate is zero. 
It may be worth expanding on the intuition behind this important result, if only to 
stress its generality. Eggertsson and Woodford’s model is a variant of the canonical New 
Keynesian sticky price model developed by Woodford (2003) and others. In that model, and 
many others, all asset prices are determined once the equilibrium pricing kernel or stochastic 
discount factor is given. Likewise, the stochastic discount factor determines the relevant 
budget constraint for the household and producers’ pricing decisions. 
In this context, an interest rate rule can affect aggregate outcomes by establishing a 
relation between the stochastic discount factor and other variables, such as inflation or the 


























  2where β  is the average household’s discount factor,  t λ  is the marginal utility of consumption, 
 the price of consumption,  the nominal interest rate for loans between periods t  and  t P t i 1 t + , 
and φ  is a function of a vector of variables  t Z , typically inflation and output. The first equality 
reflects the household’s optimal portfolio decisions; here, the stochastic discount factor is given 
by the random variable 1 / tt βλ + λ . The second equality says that the central bank sets the 
interest rate   as a function  t i φ of the vector of variables  t Z . In equilibrium, then, interest rate 
policy (e.g. a choice of the function φ  and  the  vector t Z ) implies a relation between the 
stochastic discount factor, inflation, and vector  t Z . Indeed, this is the main (and often the only) 
way in which interest rate policy affects aggregate outcomes. 
If the zero bound on the policy rate   were not a binding constraint, a choice of an 
interest rate rule 
t i
() t Z φ  would leave no room for “quantitative easing”, that is, independent 
control of the monetary base. Demand would determine the quantity of money, with the central 
bank adjusting the base as necessary to clear the market (this indeed is what an interest rate 
rule would mean). In addition, under usual assumptions on fiscal policy, changes in the 
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet (and, more generally, in the consolidated 
version of government’s) are irrelevant for aggregate outcomes. This is because the latter can 
be shown to depend only on the present value budget constraint of the government, which is 
given by its initial debt plus the appropriately discounted value of (possibly state contingent) 
fiscal deficits. 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) extend this logic to situations in which the interest 
rate policy  () t Z φ  may prescribe a zero interest rate under some circumstances (i.e. for some 
values of the vector t Z ). In those cases, they assume that the demand for money is 
indeterminate (the real demand for money being only bounded below by some satiation level). 
This allows the central bank to determine the quantity of money independently, in other words, 
to engage in “quantitative easing”. They show, however, that aggregate allocations are 
independent of the details of such quantitative easing. The logic is simple: as we just discussed, 
quantitative easing might affect aggregate outcomes, if it had some impact on the stochastic 
discount factor. But the latter is pinned down by the functionφ , as in the absence of the lower 
bound problem. 
The justification for the last assertion is illuminating. The assertion would be 
immediate if the marginal utility of consumption t λ  were independent of real money balances. 
Eggertsson and Woodford assume, however, that utility may depend on real balances in a 
nonseparable way, so  t λ  may depend on  / tt M P . However, if the interest rate is driven to zero, 
real balances must exceed the satiation level, which in turn means that the quantity of money 
has no longer any effect on utility and, all the more certainly, on  t λ . (It is in this exact sense 
that money and bonds becoming perfect substitutes at zero interest rates.) 
Having established that quantitative easing is irrelevant at zero interest rates, the 
irrelevance of altering the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet follows, as before. 
Our discussion (we hope) stresses that the logic behind the Eggertsson-Woodford 
irrelevance result is quite general and, hence, extends to a very broad class of models, 
including those most current. The result, in particular, does not hinge on the absence of 
imperfectly substitutable assets, which may have led some to suspect that changes in the size 
and composition of the central bank balance sheets would have “portfolio balance“ effects. 
Indeed, the absence of portfolio balance effects could be considered a significant flaw, and one 
could conjecture that models featuring such effects may overturn the irrelevance argument. 
But a compelling portfolio balance model of the effects of policies regarding the central bank 
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balance effects provides little support for them, as stressed by Bernanke and Reinhart (2004): 
“the limited empirical evidence suggests that, within broad classes, assets are close substitutes, 
so that changes in relative supplies of the scale observed in US experience are unlikely to have 
a major impact on risk premiums or even term premiums (Reinhart and Brian Sack, 2000).” 
To summarize, we have argued that a central bank that can commit in advance to a 
conventional interest rate policy will generally find that the zero bound on interest rates is not 
a binding restriction and, in particular, can provide monetary stimulus, even in a liquidity trap, 
by promising that future policy rate levels will be lower than they would have been otherwise. 
In addition, such a central bank will find that quantitative easing, portfolio management 
maneuvers, and other strategies for altering the size and composition of its balance sheet at 
times of zero interest rates are irrelevant. 
This given, why is it that central banks have often been unable to come out of 
deflationary liquidity traps by just promising expansionary policy in the future? The key 
conjecture is that such promises may not be credible. Credibility as a crucial constraint in this 
situation as several authors have, of course, emphasized, starting with Krugman’s analysis of 
the Japanese recession (1998). 
One implication of this observation is that the literature is full of warnings and 
admonitions about the need for central banks to ensure that announcements of future policy 
are believable, suggesting that central banks can even “manage expectations” independently of 
interest rate policy. For example, the Banqu e  d e  F r a n c e  r e c e n t l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  o n e  
unconventional policy is “influencing the yield curve by guiding expectations” (Banque de 
France 2009: 5). There is little guidance in these statements, however, as to how, precisely, the 
central bank can independently manage expectations. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004, p.86) 
acknowledged this fact, stating: “Ultimately, however, the central bank’s best strategy for 
building credibility is to build trust by ensuring that its deeds match its words...the shaping of 
expectations is not an independent policy instrument in the long run.” 
Others have responded to the credibility issue by emphasizing the need for improving 
“transparency” and “clear communication” of central bank policy intentions. Of course, it is 
hard to argue with the view that transparency and clear communication are desirable aspects 
of central bank policy. Aside from the fact that it is not clear why the need for them is greater 
when interest rates are close to zero than at other times, however, there is no generally 
accepted theory of how more or less transparency affects monetary transmission channels. 
A related claim, of particular relevance to our discussion, is that changes in the size 
and composition of the central bank balance sheet can help the credibility of the central bank’s 
announcements about future policy. And, in fact, some authors have claimed that this is the 
main role of unconventional policies. For example, Bernanke and Reinhart (2004, p. 88) argue 
that a central bank policy of setting a high target for bank reserves “...is more visible, and 
hence may be more credible, than a purely verbal promise about future short term interest 
rates.” Likewise, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) conjectured that “shifts in the portfolio of the 
central bank could be of some value in making credible to the private sector the central bank’s 
own commitment to a particular kind of future policy... ‘Signaling ‘ effects of this kind...might 
well provide a justification for open market policy when the zero bound binds.” 
To date, however, attempts to make these claims more precise are lacking. But a 
longstanding theory of monetary policy under imperfect credibility suggests several ways to 
develop this view. To illustrate, let us examine the implications of a simple model of monetary 
policy. 
  41.1.1  Unconventional Policy: An Illustrative Model 
 
We shall extend the model of Jeanne and Svensson (2007, henceforth  ). Consider a 
small, open economy with a representative agent that maximizes the discounted, expected 
utility of money holdings and consumption of tradables and nontradables. The period utility of 
tradables is lo , where    is a Cobb-Douglass aggregate of home ( ) nontradables and 
foreign (
JS
g t C t C h
f ) tradables 
1
th t CC C f t
α α − =  
ht C is, in turn, a conventional Dixit Stiglitz aggregate of domestic varieties. With the 
world price of foreign tradables normalized at one, the price of consumption is, therefore 
1
th t t PPS
α α − = , 
where   is the price of home nontradables and   the nominal exchange rate.  ht P t S
The representative agent chooses consumption and holdings of money, a world 
noncontingent bond, and domestic bonds. His sources of income in each period are wages, 
profits of domestic firms, income from previous investments, and a transfer from the central 
bank (Z in  ). It turns out that these transfers are not needed for our argument, but let us 
keep them in for now to preserve the JS notation. 
JS
There is a central bank that can print domestic currency freely to finance transfers and 
a portfolio of securities. A bond of maturity, k , is a promise to pay one unit of consumption at 
time  . For simplicity, assume that   can be either one or two, e.g. there are “short” (one-





t Q   denote the home currency price at t   of a bond promising one unit of 
consumption at ts ,  . Letting  + 1, 2 s =
s
t B  be the central bank holdings at the end of period t  
of the corresponding bond, the central bank’s budget constraint is 
11 22 1 12
11 tt tt t t t t t t 1 Z QB QB M M B QB − −− ++ = −+ +  
In contrast with JS , who examine the role of foreign exchange intervention, we 
assume that the central bank keeps zero foreign exchange reserves. Instead, it holds a portfolio 
of short and long bonds. This means that, in the central bank’s budget constraint, the crucial 
term will be the last one in the RHS, which denotes the current value of long bonds purchased 
the previous period. Hence, changes in the price of long bonds can be a source of gains or losses 
for the central bank. 
JS prove two results. The first is that a central bank that minimizes a conventional, 
expected discounted value for losses that depends only on inflation and the output gap may be 
unable to implement an optimal policy to escape from a liquidity trap, if it cannot commit to 
honoring promises of future policy. The second result is that this commitment problem may be 
solved if the central bank cares enough about its capital position. The mechanism described by 
 is for the central bank to initially acquire enough foreign exchange reserves, by either 
printing domestic currency or reducing transfers to the Treasury. This results in a currency 
mismatch and implies that, were the central bank to subsequently deviate from a promise of 
high inflation, the concomitant currency appreciation would, via the fall within the value of the 
central bank’s foreign reserves, resulting in a capital loss. This would deter the central bank 
from reneging on a promise of high inflation, if we can assume that central bank cares about its 
capital. 
JS
                                                 
1. Notice that we assume that bonds are real promises. This is a nontrivial assumption, discussed at length in the 
working paper version of  .  JS
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assets in the central bank’s portfolio. While the logic of the mechanism is essentially the same 
as in  , we will see that there are some interesting differences .  JS
First, note that the capital of the central bank is, by definition, the value of its assets 
minus liabilities: 
11 22
tt tt t VQ BQ BM =+− t
t Z
 
which, using the budget constraint above, can be rewritten as: 
   
11 2
11 1 tt t t t VMBQ B −− − =− + + −
This expresses, in particular, that the capital position of the central bank improves if  , the 
price of short bonds, increases and the central bank had a long position in two period bonds at 
the end of the previous period. This will prove to be crucial. 
1
t Q
Before elaborating on this point, let us discuss competitive equilibria. JS make the 
(usual) assumptions setting the current account always at zero and making tradable 
consumption constant. Nontradable consumption, meanwhile, equals nontradable output: 
ht t
Nontradables are produced with only labor and a linear technology, by monopolistically 
competitive firms that choose prices one period in advance. As is well known, the typical firm 
( ) chooses a price that is a constant markup over marginal cost: 















where ε   is the elasticity of substitution between varieties,  the wage, and   aggregate 
productivity. Now, optimal labor choice implies 













































− ∗ = . 
Here, the real exchange rate is defined as 
/ tt QS P = h t  























  6where  f C   is the constant equilibrium consumption of tradables. The real exchange rate, 
therefore, depreciates if domestic output increases (this is one source of  ’s main results).  JS
To allow for the possibility of a “liquidity trap,” assume that there is a nominal bond. 
Then the nominal interest rate must equal 
,1 1




























This is a key equation: it says that the real interest rate must fall, if output is expected 
to decline. JS consider a situation in which at  1 t =   the log of productivity is equal to its 
previous steady state, say  , but we know that it will fall to b a a <  from period   on. This 
can lead the economy to a liquidity trap, as we now argue. 
2 t =
Start by assuming that the central bank minimizes a conventional loss: 
t
t E L δ ∑ , 
where 
22 1
[( ) ( ) ]
2
tt t t Ly ππ λ =− + − y  
(From hereon, lowercase variables are logs of respective uppercase ones.) To see how a 
liquidity trap may emerge, note that 
11 tt t h t t t p ppq p π α −− =− = + −  














1 () th t t t t t p qp yy π αα − =+−+ − 
Under discretion, the policymaker would minimize   subject to the preceding equation, which 
would yield 
t L




=− − . 
Recalling, however, that there are no unexpected shocks in periods   on,  in 
equilibrium 
2 t =
tt Y  for all t except possibly for t Y =   1 = . Therefore,  t π π = ,  2,3, t .... Th
. 
= is is key, 
and it means that inflation is at the target in all periods, expect possibly in period  1 t =
JS show that, if b   is sufficiently low relative to a , the economy will fall into a 
liquidity trap in period one, that is, a situation in which the interest rate  1 i  falls to zero, and 
output falls short of the natural level. This results in lower welfare than under commitment. 
With commitment, the central bank would promise to increase  2 π  over π  to spread the cost of 
the productivity fall between periods one and two. However, in the absence of a commitment 
device, this promise would not be kept: in period 2, it would be optimal for the central bank to 
reduce  2 π  to the target π . 
To see the role of debt management, let us focus on the pricing of bonds of different 








+ = . 
  7This says that the return on one-period bonds must be equal to the return on nominal 
bonds. Now, recalling that  t π π =  for  ,  2 t ≥
11
11






∗+ ++ == = , 




∗ − = t . (1) 
Note that this says that the price of one-period bonds is proportional to the price level 
from period 2 on. 
Also, under perfect foresight, arbitrage implies that the price of a two period bond 
equals the product of the prices of one-period bonds now and next period: 
21 1
1 tt t QQ Q + = . (2) 
These facts now lead us to our main result. Suppose that, at $t=1$, the central bank 
learns about a future decline in productivity and sells $x$ short bonds and buys an equivalent 
amount of long bonds. The amount of long bonds purchased is denoted by , that 
is 
12 2









By construction, this operation has no impact on either the budget constraint or the 
central bank’s capital position at .  1 t =
If the central bank could commit to the optimal (under commitment) policy, the 
operation would not affect its budget constraint nor its capital position in any subsequent 
periods either. This is because the arbitrage condition (2) would guarantee that the value of the 
inherited portfolio would be zero: 
1
11 2 1 1




BQ B x Q x
Q
+= + −= 0 . 
Notably, this is an instance of Eggertsson and Woodford’s irrelevance result: under 
commitment, open market operations are irrelevant. 
But suppose that the central bank has no commitment and can contemplate a deviation 
from the optimal plan. As shown in   (and intuitively obvious), the central bank would then 
have an incentive to reduce inflation towards the target, thus cutting   from its optimal level 
to a lower level, say . However, since there are no incentives for further deviations, prices of 





t 3 =  would fall, by (1), to some level
1
2 () Q
′. Then the value of the central 
bank portfolio would be: 
1
11 2 1 1

























2 < , that is, if the central bank 
surprisingly changes policy in a way that leads to lower prices. It follows that the deviation is 
not profitable for the central bank, if it cares about its capital position and x  is negative and 
sufficiently large in absolute value. 
In words, the central bank can ensure the credibility of an inflationary policy by 
changing the composition of its balance sheet, selling short-term bonds and holding long term 
bonds. This is crucial to equilibrium, not because such an “unconventional” measure would 
  8change the equilibrium outcome (which is the same as the outcome under commitment), but 
because the debt structure can change the incentives for the central bank, to discourage 
deviation from the desired equilibrium: a deflationary surprise would reduce the value of the 
latter, inflicting a punishment on the central bank. 
The argument here is therefore related to the classic Lucas and Stokey (1983) study of 
optimal policy under time inconsistency. As in that paper, debt maturity is irrelevant under 
commitment, but can be crucial under discretion. 
Our discussion also stresses that the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet 
can be managed in several alternative ways to provide the proper incentives for the central 
bank. As mentioned, our argument here is similar but not the same as in , who focused on 
international reserves management. Compared with their argument, the one here is cleaner, 
because we do not need to worry about central bank transfers (the 
JS
Z s above), which figure 
somewhat prominently in JS. In fact, we eliminated the transfers completely. On the other 
hand, and obviously, we depend on having a rich enough menu of assets, in this case debts with 
different maturities. 
Our analysis provides a concrete setting in which unconventional central bank policy 
not only helps but is in fact crucial to implementing optimal monetary policy. What is the value 
of such an exercise? For one thing, it clarifies the sense in which management of the central 
bank balance sheet can indeed complement conventional interest rate policy, much more 
effectively than vague statements, such as “the central bank’s open market operations should 
be chosen with a view to signaling the nature of its policy commitments”. Indeed, our analysis 
has not relied on the existence of asymmetric information of any sort, and therefore leaves no 
room for any kind of signaling. 
Moreover, a formal analysis opens the way to interpreting and identifying the validity 
(or lack thereof) of many claims in the policy literature. To cite but one example, to justify 
unconventional measures, the Bank of Canada has cited the principle of “prudence “, meaning 
that the Bank should “mitigate financial risks to its balance sheet, which could arise from 
changes in yields (valuation losses) or from the credit performance of private sector assets 
(credit losses),” (Bank of Canada 2009, p. 29). But in the analysis above it is precisely the 
possibility of such valuation losses that lend credibility to the central bank’s promises to keep 
interest rates low, even as inflation overshoots its target. 
Notably, our analysis explains why, for justification’s sake, these operations may have 
to be carried out by the central bank, instead of, say, the Treasury. This is relevant, because 
often the reasons given to justify altering the size and composition of the central bank’s balance 
sheet are really reasons to change “fiscal” policy rather than central bank policy. Here, the 
open market operations in play are designed to affect the central bank’s incentives, which 
would not happen if an alternative agency were to carry out such operations. 
 
1.1.2 Alternative  Solutions  to the Commitment Problem 
 
Our discussion has emphasized that one fruitful way to rationalize unconventional 
policy may be to see the management of the central bank’s portfolio as a commitment device. 
This perspective also suggests we should look for more general insights in the rich literature on 
policy under time inconsistency and lack of commitment. 
Walsh (1995), for example, emphasized that one way to solve the classical time 
inconsistency problem in monetary policy is to provide optimal contracts to central bankers, a 
view that has been associated with the widespread acceptance of inflation targeting in a 
context of central bank independence. 
Arguably, Walsh’s view remains quite relevant to solving the credibility problem with 
zero interest rates too. In the context of the model described in the preceding subsection (and 
the analysis in  ), we mentioned that a critical part of the “solution” is the assumption that 
the central bank cares about its capital. But, where does this concern come from? The problem 
arose because, presumably, the central banker had been assigned (at some point before the 
JS
  9start of the analysis) a mandate to minimize a loss function with inflation and the output gap 
as arguments. A suggestion echoing Walsh’s would then be to enlarge that loss function with a 
term inflicting a penalty on the central banker, if bank capital were to fall below some value. 
But if that is in fact the case, one could and should also ask the more general (Walsh’s) 
question of what is the optimal contract to the central banker. This would recognize, in 
particular, that the contract may not entail an inflation target, even if inflation targeting 
would be optimal under commitment. This issue may, in fact, have gone beyond theory and 
become quite influential in practice. Specifically, Svensson (2001) has advocated that one way 
to solve the credibility problem in a liquidity trap may be to switch the objective of the central 
bank from inflation targeting to price level targeting, and that strategy has actually been 
embraced by Sweden. Our analysis suggests that this reform may be understood as a way to 
modify the loss function assigned to the central banker, to provide the correct incentives for 
implementing the optimal monetary policy. 
 
1.2  Financial Frictions, Bank Capital, and Heterodox Policy 
 
An alternative prima facie justification for central banks resorting to new policy 
instruments has been that the recent crisis involved a combination of skyrocketing interest 
rate spreads, frozen credit markets, and paralyzed financial institutions. In this context, it was 
clear that the traditional monetary policy tool, that is, the supply of bank reserves to target an 
overnight interbank interest rate, seemed to have become completely ineffective. In particular, 
additional liquidity in the interbank market was hoarded by the banks, apparently in some 
cases in an effort to reconstitute their severely impaired capital levels. Thus, as described, 
several central banks stepped into credit markets and started expanding the size and scope of 
rediscounting operations, swapping questionable assets for safer government debt and, in some 
cases, lending directly to the private sector. 
These developments have stimulated a small but growing literature attempting to 
understand the interaction of unconventional monetary policies with financial imperfections 
and the behavior of the banking system. As the discussion suggests, significant progress on this 
front will require not only analyzing the implications of endowing the monetary authorities 
with a policy arsenal that includes more than interest rate control, but also introducing a 
nontrivial banking system into current theory. This will demand, in turn, dropping the crucial 
assumption of frictionless financial markets, which currently pervades dominant models.2 
Unfortunately, no current theory of banks exists yet that is both widely accepted and 
tractable enough to be embedded into the stochastic dynamic models that characterize modern 
monetary theory. As a result, recent attempts have been as much about this modeling issue as 
about the effects of unconventional policy. For example, an influential study by Christiano, 
Motto, and Rostagno (2007) models banks, following what Freixas (2008) calls the “industrial 
organization” approach. In contrast, in Gertler and Karadi (2009), banks are agents that 
borrow from households and lend to firms, subject to a moral hazard problem. Similarly, 
Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) modify the basic New Keynesian model, by assuming that 
households differ in their preferences, thus creating a social function for financial 
intermediation. 
On the consequences for monetary policy of these studies, one initial conclusion is that 
augmenting a standard Taylor rule to respond mechanically to changes in the spread between 
lending rates and deposit rates may not be optimal. How effective this action is, will depend on 
the type of shock that generates the increase in the spread. Now, in terms of credit policy, i.e. 
direct lending by the central bank to non-financial firms, this policy would be optimal if private 
financial markets are sufficiently impaired (Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) and Gertler and 
Karadi (2009)). 
                                                 
2. Needless to say, the analysis of the previous subsection may require significant changes, if perfect financial markets 
are not assumed. 
  10However, the state of affairs is such that it may be premature to try to draw firm 
conclusions from these studies, and indeed the papers just cited are still being refined and may 
change substantially. Nevertheless, they represent a shifting perspective that is likely to stay 
and, hence, worth discussing in more detail. To do so, we discuss next a related model of ours, 
designed to illustrate several of the issues involved. 
 
1.2.1  An Illustrative Model 
 
This model is a stochastic, discrete time version of Edwards and Végh (1997), with one 
crucial modification: bank lending is constrained by their capital. This change is not only 
warranted by current events but also implies, as we will see, a substantial departure in terms 
of model solution and dynamics. 
Consider an infinite horizon, small, open economy. There is only one good in each 
period, freely traded and with a world price that we assume to be constant (at one) in terms of 
a world currency. 
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To motivate a demand for bank deposits, we assume that deposits are necessary for 
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The household owns domestic firms and banks, and receives transfers from or pays taxes to the 
government. Hence its flow budget constraint is given by: 
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  are profits from banks and firms,    government transfers (or taxes, if 
negative), and   is the real wage. For simplicity, we are assuming that the household cannot 
lend or borrow in the world market. Our arguments extend easily, if the household can lend 
but not borrow there, as we shall see. 
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Let  tt λω  and  t λ  be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the deposit in advance 
constraint and the flow budget constraint respectively. Optimal household behavior is then 
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These have natural interpretations. In particular, the first condition emphasizes that the 
household equates the marginal utility of consumption to its shadow cost, inclusive of the cost 
of the deposit in advance constraint. Likewise, the third condition emphasizes that the return 
to deposits must include the benefit from relaxing the deposit in advance constraint. 
We now turn to production. There is a continuum of identical domestic firms, each able 
to produce tradables, with a linear technology that employs only labor: 
tt t y Al =  
  11where  is an e ogenous productivity shock. 
T riately discounted value of dividends: 
where flow profits are given by: 
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γ Here, we assume that the firm must borrow from banks a fraction   of the wage bill 
tt t hw l γ ≥ . 
This working cap al assumption is introduced to motivate a demand for bank loans. So  it t h  
denotes the amount that the firm must borrow, and the real loan rate is 
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In each period the firm chooses   and  . Letting  t l t h t φ  be the multiplier on the finance 
constra ’s re int, the first order conditions for the firm  problem a  
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Note that the first condition stresses that the cost of labor must include the financial 
cost associated with the working capital constraint. 
Next, turn to the banking sector. As in Edwards and Végh (1997), banks are modeled 
following an industrial organization approach. This is appealing, because that approach 
implies that there will be spreads between deposit and lending rates. But, as mentioned, we 
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and    denotes credit to firms,  t z t f  required  reserves,  t x foreign borrowing, and   cost 
n : 
t r of 
foreig  borrowing. We also assume a reserve requirement
tt f d δ ≥ , 
δ where   is the required reserves coefficient. Finally, we assume that leverage is limited: 
tt n z χ ≤ , 
where the bank’s capita is given by 
The leverage ratio 
l n  
tt tt t nfz d =+−−   x
χ , which could be time varying, is the key innovation of this model 
relative to Edwards and Végh (1997) and others (such as Catão and Rodriguez 2000). One could 
rationalize the leverage constraint as a shortcut to modeling agency problems of the type 
emphasized by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and, more recently, Gertler and Karadi (2009). We 
assume χ  is greater than one, and reflects either regulation or agency issues. 
  12Finally,  (, ) tt t zd ξη
(.)
is the resource cost of “producing” deposits and credit. We use the 
functional form for η , proposed by Edwards & Végh (1997), but introduce a parameter κ  
that determines the weight of firm credit in the bank’s cost function: 
22 (1 ) zd ηκ κ =+ −. 
Assume that the reserve requirement holds with equality, and let  t θ  be the multiplier 




(1 ) ( , ) (1 ) (1 )
d tt



















+ −= +  (4) 
1
1 1( , ) ( 1 ) ( 1
l t
tt t t t t
t
zd E r )
λ
ξη θ χ β
λ
+ +− − =+  
The model is closed by a specification of government policy. Clearly, we have set up the 
model so that we can discuss the effects of  “unconventional” policy on allocations and prices, 
including the volume of bank intermediation and credit spreads. 
For now, assume the simplest: the government rebates to households the gains from 
imposing reserve requirements. Also, assume (as in Edwards and Végh 1997) that  (, ) tt t zd ξη  











− =− +  
To finish, we need a specification for inflation policy. Here the government controls 
. This matters, despite flexible prices, because required reserves are paying the 
inflation tax. 
1 / tt PP − =Π t
t +
Note that, with these assumption, in equilibrium, the economy’s overall constraint 
reduces to 
11 (1 ) tt t tt rx A lcx −− += − , 
whose interpretation is clear: the repayment on foreign borrowing is equal to the trade surplus 
plus new borrowing. 
Finally, we need to make an assumption about the world interest rate  . For now, 
assume it is constant at r . Also, we will assume 
t r
∗ (1 ) 1 r β
∗ + < . The need for this becomes 
apparent upon examination of the nonstochastic steady state. In steady state, the bank’s 
optimality condition for the amount to borrow in the world market, (4), reduces to 
1( 1) r β θχ
∗ −+=  (5) 
As we are about to solve for a linear approximation of the dynamics around the steady 
state, we need to make a decision as to whether the leverage constraint binds in steady state. 
We will assume that it does, which requires that θ  be strictly positive in steady state. Hence 
 must be less than one.  (1 ) r β
∗ +
The interpretation of the Lagrange multiplier θ  is illuminating. θ  is the shadow cost 
to banks of the leverage requirement. Accordingly, if the leverage coefficient χ  increases, θ  
must fall. This is natural since a higher χ  allows banks to increase leverage. 
The model can be calibrated and solved in the usual way. Then one can examine the 
implications of alternative policies of interest. For illustrative purposes, we assume a world 
interest rate percent of 2%, a reserve requirement ratio (δ ) percent of 10%, and a leverage 
  13ratio (χ ) equal to 3%. The household’s deposit requirement (α ) is assumed to be 0.2 while the 
fraction of the wage bill that firms must borrow is assumed to equal 0.5. The remaining 
parameters are presented in Table 1. Our parametrization implies that the steady state, 
interest rate spread is equal to 7.7%. In the steady state, the economy’s external debt 
corresponds to almost 30% of total lending to firms, deposits 41%, and the remainder is 
financed with the banks’ own net worth. 
 
Table 1. Parameter Values 
 
Parameter Description  Value 
δ   Reserve ratio requirement  0.1 
χ   Leverage ratio  3 
α   Household deposit requirement  0.2 
γ   Fraction of wage bill firms must borrow 0.5 
β   Discount factor  0.971 
t r   World interest rate  0.02 
κ   Weight on firm credit in bank’s costs  0.8 
   Policy rule parameter  -2 
Π   Inflation rate ( )  1 / tt PP + 1 
A ρ   Persistence of shock to A  0.95 
ξ ρ   Persistence of shock to ξ   0.95 
r ρ   Persistence of shock to r  0.95 
 
To evaluate the dynamics of the economy, we study the impulse response functions of 
the model’s main variables to world interest rate and banking cost shocks. Figures 1-2 display 
the impulse responses of the calibrated model to a 1% shock to the bank cost ξ . As Edwards 
and Végh (1997) stress, this can be interpreted as a domestic shock (change in regulation or 
shocks to the underlying banking technology) or as an external shock (such as an international 
financial crisis). A shock to the bank’s cost function is associated with an increase in the real 
lending rate and a fall in the deposit rate (see Figure 1). The increase in banking costs 
increases the marginal cost of extending credit. On the deposit side, the increase in producing 
deposits reduces the deposit rate paid to consumers. This reduction in the deposit rate 
increases the price of consumption. On the lending side, the increase in the marginal cost of 
producing loans increases the lending rate. In equilibrium, the lending spread increases. This 
is in line with intuition and is consistent with Edwards and Végh’s discussion. Figure 2 shows 
that the result is an aggregate contraction, expressed in a fall in credit and, concomitantly, 
labor employment and wages. 
 
  14Figure 1. Adjustment path to shock in bank costs 
 
Figure 2. Adjustment path to shock in bank costs 
 
  15Figures 3-4 display impulse responses to an one-hundred-basis-point increase in the 
world interest rate. Figure 3 shows that both domestic rates, lending and deposit rates, 
increase as a result. But interestingly, deposit rates increase more than lending rates, so the 
spread between the two shrinks. The increase in the world interest rate increases the cost of 
external borrowing. Banks will try to substitute this external lending by increasing the deposit 
rate. The lending rate increases, but less than the deposit rate, as the higher world interest 
rate has a negative wealth effect on the economy, which reduces consumption and lending in 
equilibrium. Figure 4 shows that credit and consumption fall persistently. Aside from a small 
impact decrease, labor employment is essentially not affected. 
 
Figure 3. Adjustment path to shock in world interest rates 
 
Figure 4. Adjustment path to shock in world interest rates 
 
  16In this model, we can examine the effects of different, “unconventional” policies. For 
example, one might conjecture that a policy of reducing reserve requirements when spreads 
increase could be stabilizing. To analyze this conjecture in our model, we drop the assumption 
of a constant δ , and assume that 
() =+ −
ld
tt rr δδ  t  
where  δ   is the steady state value of  t δ  and    governs the sensitivity of the reserve 
coefficient’s response to the domestic spread. 

Figures 5-6 and 7-8 display the impulse responses to the same shocks as those 
represented in Figures 1-4, namely shocks to the banking cost function and to the world 
interest rate. Figure 5 is quite similar to Figure 1, suggesting that reducing reserve 
requirements in response to increases in the domestic spread may have little impact on deposit 
and lending rates. Comparing Figure 6 to Figure 2 ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e v e a l s  t h a t  t h i s  p o l i c y  h a s  
significantly stabilizes credit and labor employment on impact, although for this 
parametrization the stabilizing effect only lasts for one period. The reduction in reserve 
requirement slightly mitigates the impact of higher marginal costs in the production of deposit 
and loans. 
 
Figure 5. Adjustment path to shock in bank costs 
 
  17Figure 6. Adjustment path to shock in bank costs 
 
Figure 7 shows that the reserve requirement policy also has negligible effects on the 
response of domestic interest rates to an increase in the world rate. Figure 8, however, shows 
that the policy has somewhat surprising real effects: credit falls by more and consumption by 
less than without the policy (as depicted in Figure 4). The reason is that the policy rule makes 
t δ  increase, not fall, in response to an increase in the world interest rate: such a shock makes 
domestic lending rates and deposit rates increase, but their difference falls. 
 
Figure 7. Adjustment path to shock in world interest rates 
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There are a number of lessons here. The effect of an “obvious policy” is not obvious and 
depends delicately on the both model and policy details. But our model clarifies and provides 
useful information about the different channels. Here, for example, given our discussion, one 
could now conjecture that the problem is that  t δ  is responding to the domestic spread, but that 
it may be better for  t δ  to respond to the international spread, as in 
() =+ −
l
tt rr δδ  t  
where   is the world rate of interest. But here such a change is probably of little help, because 
  increases by less than    in response to a shock to the latter, and hence 
t r
l
t r t r t δ  would  also 
increase (perversely) with the modified policy. 
More generally, the model here is an example of the kind of theory that needs to be 
developed to be able to discuss consistently the unconventional policies that have been 
implemented in practice. Only with this kind of framework can we trace the effects of policies 
that respond to interest rate spreads or prescriptions to inject equity into banks. In contrast, 
standard models are silent about these issues, because their perfect financial market 
assumption clouds perception of financial intermediation. 
 
2.  Heterodox Monetary Policy: Recent Experience and Evidence 
 
From the previous section, we have concluded that quantitative easing (outright 
purchases of assets by the central bank and changes in the central bank portfolio) appears 
relevant only if it helps to increase the credibility of a given monetary policy rate path. We 
have also noted that it is premature to conclude that credit easing is useful as a policy in and of 
itself or as a commitment device for a particular monetary policy trajectory. Nevertheless, 
credit policy may be seen as necessary in case of disrupted financial markets or as a 
complement to traditional monetary policy actions in particular cases. 
With this in mind we present some evidence regarding monetary policy actions in the 
recent financial crisis, as some countries reached the (actual) lower bound. We restrict our 
  19a n a l y s i s  t o  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  s o m e  ( q u a s i )  f o r m a l  inflation target to have a more adequate 
comparison. 
 
2.1  Recent Experience with Unconventional Monetary Policy 
 
Starting with the sub-prime mortgage crisis, we have witnessed an unprecedented 
period of monetary policy activism. Even though the original trigger for the various kinds of 
interventions can be traced to the international financial crisis, the objectives and immediate 
motivations are somehow different. In the first, pre-Lehman Brothers period, monetary policy 
rates in most countries aimed to control inflation, which was high due to high energy and other 
commodity prices. At the same time, governments took actions to provide liquidity in foreign 
currency markets. After the Lehman bankruptcy, things changed. Liquidity provision 
intensified, while the rapid fall in commodity prices opened the door for aggressive cuts to 
interest rates. In this period, some central banks also implemented policies to address 
malfunctioning financial markets (credit policy). As interest rate cuts intensified, some 
countries reached a lower bound for the monetary policy rate. At this point, we saw some 
central banks implementing additional non-conventional policies to reinforce the credibility of 
the announcement that interest rates would be kept low for a long time. 
 
2.1.1  The Pre-Lehman Bankruptcy Period 
 
The outbreak of the mortgage-backed, security crisis was the beginning of a period of 
significant tensions in financial markets around the world. These tensions were initially 
limited to the US and England, but expanded to other developed economies during the first 
half of 2008. In most cases, they led to the need to inject significant amounts of liquidity in 
foreign currency markets. The basic objective of the liquidity provision actions was to reduce 
pressures on US dollar, short-term funding markets. In particular, from September 2007 to 
September 2008, many central banks implemented different varieties of US dollar repo 
transactions. Sometimes these operations were complemented by reciprocal swap agreements 
between the US Federal Reserve and some central banks. 
In the same period, monetary policy in most central banks focused on dealing with 
rising inflation, due to the commodity prices shock. In fact, during this period many countries 
increased interest rates as they implemented measures to inject liquidity in domestic financial 
markets. Nevertheless, those countries (USA, Canada and the UK) most exposed to the sub-
prime mortgage crisis started reducing policy interest rates as credit conditions tightened and 
the macroeconomic outlook worsened. 
 
2.1.2  The Post-Lehman Bankruptcy Period 
 
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 triggered a new phase in 
monetary policy. The demand for liquidity intensified significantly, causing central banks 
around the world to either introduce or intensify previous efforts to provide liquidity. 
This is also the period in which we started to observe a clear change towards an 
expansionary monetary policy stance. With inflationary pressures subsiding due to a marked 
decline in energy and other commodity prices, and the intensification of the financial crisis, 
which increased the downside risks to growth and thus to price stability, some easing of global 
monetary conditions was warranted. In line with this outlook, in the fourth quarter of 2008, a 
group of countries aggressively cut the monetary policy rate (see Figure 9). Others stopped 
raising interest rates, due to the worsening economic outlook (see Figure 9). An additional 
signal of the (potential) magnitude of events facing the world the unprecedented joint action 
taken by a group of major central banks in October 8: a coordinated cut to interest rates. This 
measure involved the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the 
Federal Reserve, the Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank. The Bank of Japan 
expressed its strong support. 
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During this period, financial conditions deteriorated markedly. The combination of high 
uncertainty, lower growth perspectives (and commodity prices) and the worsening 
international financial conditions gave rise to very restrictive credit conditions. Lending 
spreads increased significantly (see Figure 10) and credit to firms became quite scarce. In this 
scenario, many central banks contemplated the possibility of disruptions in the monetary policy 
transmission channel. This explains why, in some cases, monetary policy focused initially on 
restoring the financial market functioning rather than to reducing interest rates. Also some 
countries did not reduce interest rates until it was clear that inflation pressures had been 
mitigated. As commodity prices started to fall, in the last quarter of 2008, inflation also 
plunged. 
 




In the scenario of tight credit conditions, some countries implemented asset purchase 
programs, while others started lending to banks, accepting commercial paper as collateral. The 
                                                 
3 Note: The left axes indicates the lending-deposit spread and the right axes plots the monetary policy rate. The data 
for Canada and Norway is quarterly. 
  22asset purchase programs sought to push up the price of treasury bills. For countries with more 
severe financial market disruptions, the asset purchase programs involved buying private 
assets directly (US, England) or through special funds (Korea, Switzerland). Now, the most 
common action to improve the supply of loans to the 
corporate sector was to expand the list of acceptable collateral in operations with the central 
bank to include commercial paper, corporate securities, asset-backed securities, mortgage 
securities and securities with lower credit ratings. In some cases, the easing of collateral 
requirements was complemented by the introduction of special credit facilities to eligible 
financial institutions against selected collateral, mainly commercial papers. Additionally, some 
central banks broadened eligible counterparties for liquidity provision operations. 
Since January 2009 all central banks in our sample started to lower interest rates. At 
that point it became clear that the deterioration in world activity, the reduction in commodity 
prices, and higher output gaps was giving rise to deflation concerns. Many central banks 
revised their inflation forecasts downward, by significant amounts. As a result, actions to inject 
liquidity to financial markets continued, but liquidity concerns subsided. Instead, the focus of 
monetary policy shifted to the financial crisis’ effects on economic activity. Some countries also 
hit the lower bound in this period and implemented measures to deal with this problem. 
At this point, some countries engaged in exchange rate intervention. In particular, and 
in line with the search for ways to deal with the lack of monetary policy stimulus at the lower 
bound, developed countries started to buy dollars to avoid further appreciation of their 
currencies. Additionally some central banks started to buy bonds issued by private sector 
borrowers. One special feature of these interventions was that many central banks stated 
clearly that unconventional measures did not compromise medium- and long-term price 
stability. 
Even though some central banks recognized that financial systems were well prepared 
to face the turbulence, the financial crisis’ effect on credit provision was evident. As mentioned 
before, that led some central banks to establish loan facilities to increase access to credit with 
longer duration. 
Tight credit conditions led many central banks to open new facilities to financial 
intermediaries, to stimulate bank lending to non-financial companies. Many central banks 
were concerned about direct lending. The Riksbank stated in November 28 “…the Riksbank 
should not lend directly to non-financial companies, because that would be a departure from 
the Riksbank’s traditional role as the banks’ bank.” That position led the Riksbank to lend to 
financial intermediaries instead of lending directly to non-financial firms (they did so by 
offering loans to banks using commercial paper as collateral). 
For the group of countries that reached the lower bound, in addition to announcing this 
fact, a new communication instrument joined the traditional monetary policy announcement: 
central banks indicated that the interest rate was going to be kept at that level for a long time. 
Moreover, some central banks opened credit facilities at fixed rates with maturities consistent 
with the announcement of a prolonged period of monetary policy rate at the lower bound. This 
was a clear indication that central banks were using mechanisms to increase the credibility of 
their announcements. 
Regarding the period of time during which interest rates were going to be kept constant, 
some central banks were very explicit (beyond the ones that already published monetary policy 
rate path). For example, the Bank of Canada announced (April 2009) that it was cutting its 
monetary policy rate (MPR) to 0.25% and committed to holding that rate until the end of the 
second quarter of 2010. Other central banks announced exchange rate interventions to prevent 
any appreciation of the exchange rate or to restore the level of foreign currency reserves. 
Finally, it is worth noting that most of the aggressive policies implemented by central 
banks were generally followed by important fiscal stimulus packages, as Figure 11 illustrates, 
for a selected group of countries. 
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2.2   Alternative Measures of Monetary Conditions 
 
As we have seen, central banks around the world have recently engaged in many 
unconventional operations. Excluding those exclusively oriented to restoring liquidity, we can 
associate other measures to the need to reinforce monetary policy stimulus to the economy, 
particularly in the presence of the lower bound, and to the need to unlock financial markets, a 
key channel of the monetary policy transmission process. In normal times, changes in the 
monetary policy rate is generally used as a sufficient statistic to describe the monetary policy 
stance. This practice presents a challenge when this rate reaches its lower bound and it is 
interesting to analyze different measures to account for the monetary conditions. In the next 
section, we describe a number of exercises trying to quantify the monetary policy stance after 
September 2008. In particular, we analyze the size and composition of central bank balance 
sheets and a Monetary Conditions Index. We then go on to evaluate the effectiveness of 
unconventional monetary policy actions. Before going into this exercise, we will present 
estimations for the monetary policy interest rates implied by Taylor rules. From this exercise 
we can evaluate the potential magnitude of the need to generate additional monetary policy 
stimulus at the lower bound. 
 
2.2.1 Taylor  Rules 
 
To evaluate the need for monetary policy stimulus we perform a simple exercise: we 
compare the observed behavior of monetary policy rates against the path implied by a Taylor 
rule. For countries that have reached the lower bound, the difference between these two paths 
can indicate that a further monetary impulse is warranted. We proceed by estimating a rule 
where the current value of the monetary policy rate responds to a three-month-lagged value of 
this rate, the output gap (measured as a deviation from an HP trend) and the annual rate of 
inflation of CPI inflation.4 Additionally, we also considered the possibility of the policy rate 
reacting to either nominal (against the US dollar) or real (multilateral) annual exchange rate 
                                                 
4. The results are robust when using deviations of observed inflation from the target, for those countries that announce 
an explicit target. 
  24depreciation. The estimation was performed using data until 2007, using the resulting 
coefficients to compute the implied paths for the Taylor rule from that date onwards.5  
 
Table 2. Taylor Rules. Percentage reduction between Sep-08 and Aug-09. 
 











Australia  50 32 31 30 71 
Canada  92 90 84 84  171 
Chile  88 59 58 58  104 
Colombia  51 40 42 43  102 
Euro  67 81 67 68  288 
Japan  80  108 112 112 150 
Korea  62 55 55 55 30 
New  Zealand  49  9 9 9  41 
Norway  72 50 51 54 17 
Sweden  89  126 127 124 260 
Switzerland  99  103 117 103 149 
England  90 85 85 81  101 
United States  88  128  128  –  347 
Note: Data is monthly for all countries, except the following: Australia, New Zealand and 
Switzerland (results based on quarterly data, and data ends in the first quarter of 2009); Canada, 
Japan, and Korea (quarterly data in the case of rules including the real exchange rate); Chile was 
estimated using data from 07-2001 on, to account for the change in the policy instrument. The long- 
run Taylor rule applied involved multiplying coefficients for output gap and inflation by 
1/(1 ) i ρ − i , with ρ   being the estimated coefficient on the lagged policy rate. The last two 
columns correspond to the specification without exchange rates. 
 
 
Columns three to five in Table 2 display the percentage reduction in the policy rate 
obtained for different specifications of the Taylor rule, from September 2008 to the last 
available observation, while the second column reports the actual change, for comparison. The 
results do not show a clear pattern. Only for Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the US and, to a 
lesser extent, the Euro Area, the Taylor rule indicates a bigger reduction than actually 
observed. 6 For the other countries, the predicted changes in these three columns either 
approached or were significantly smaller than actual reductions. 
A concern about the results based on a rule that contains a smoothing parameter is 
that this backward-looking component may not be appropriate to describe behavior when the 
lower bound is binding. One would expect this coefficient to change (probably moving closer to 
zero) as the rate approaches the lower bound, particularly in a period of sudden, financial 
distress, for the monetary authority will be less concerned about reducing the volatility in 
                                                 
5. We used iterative GMM for the estimation, using as instruments the lagged values of the regressors and current and 
lagged values of oil prices and the CRB commodity price index. In an attempt to make results robust to the lag 
selection for the instruments, we estimated each equation using from two to twelve lags for monthly data (one to four 
for quarterly), and use the median across the different alternatives of each coefficients to make the out-of-sample 
forecast. 
6. Rudebusch (2009), for instance, finds a similar result for the US, although using forecasts from the FOMC meetings 
to compute the predicted path instead of actual data as we do. 
  25interest rates than in regular times. One way to control for this effect is to use a “long-run” 
Taylor rule, in which the interest rate depends solely on inflation and the output gap, and the 
coefficients for these variables are those estimated in the baseline case, adjusted by (1 ) i ρ − , 
with  i ρ   being the estimated coefficient on the lagged policy rate. That is, if the originally 
estimated rule is 
1 ti t ty ii π t y ρ ρπ ρ − =++  , 
T h e n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t  o f  a  c h a n g e  i n   t π  and  t y   are,  respectively, 
/( 1 ) i π ρ ρ − and /( 1 ) yi ρ ρ −  , provided || 1 i ρ < . In this way, this alternative assumes that the 
response to inflation and the output gap is the same as historically described, once we adjust 
for the usual reaction to lagged interest rates. 
The sixth column in Table 2 computes the implied reduction using the “long-run” rule.7 
With a few exceptions, results appear more conclusive in this case: the long-run rule 
recommends a much lower rate than the observed one. For instance, if we compute the average 
reduction that this rule implies for countries that have maintained a low policy rate, we obtain 
a reduction of 140%, while this same statistic for the other countries (not shown in the table) is 
46%. Additionally, it is interesting to notice that for those countries that have decreased and 
maintained the rate to a low level but at a value significantly greater than zero (Australia, 
Korea, New Zealand and Norway), the Taylor rule implies, with the exception of Australia, that 
the policy rate should be above its actual, low level. In particular, the average observed 
reduction within this group was 58%, while the rule suggested an average reduction close to 
40%. Moreover, these are the only countries in this sample for which this long-run rule would 
not have predicted a negative interest rate. On the other hand, for those that have reached a 
bound close to zero, the mean observed reduction was 83%, while the Taylor rule suggested a 
drop of nearly 186%, on average. In particular, the biggest differences between the actual 
change in the policy rate and that implied by the rule are for the US, the Euro Area and 
Sweden, while for Chile, Colombia and England the rule would have recommended driving the 
rate to a value just below zero. 
To check for the robustness of our results we do a simple exercise. We compute a 
common-parameter Taylor rule for the countries under analysis. In particular we compute an 
implicit monetary policy rate from the following Taylor rule: ( ) tt ii y π y t ρ ππ ρ =+ − +  , where 
 corresponds to the average rate in the past 10 years, and  i π  corresponds to the inflation 
target. This is equivalent to having a common central banker for these countries. We use 
quarterly data to have a common measure of activity (output). In Figure 12 we show the 
arguments of our Taylor rule, the deviation of inflation from the target and the output gap. The 
output gap is computed using the HP filter. 
 
                                                 
7. Results are similar if we included measures of exchange rates in the rule. 





As can be seen, prior to September 2008, all of countries in our sample had inflation 
rates above the inflation target (in the case of the US and Euro Area we use implicit targets of 
2% and 1.5% respectively). This is consistent with monetary policy rate management before the 
Lehman bankruptcy. In some cases, this deviation persisted, at a lower intensity, in the last 
quarter of 2008. Nevertheless, the general picture is that after the third quarter of 2008 
inflation plunged below target, in most of the cases between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the 
third quarter of 2009. Regarding the output gap, by the first quarter of 2009, all countries in 
the sample were experiencing a negative output gap. 
 



















Next, we use the previous information to estimate monetary policy rates for two 
different versions of Taylor rules, presented in Figure 13. The results indicate that, for all the 
countries that reached the lower bound, our common parameter monetary policy rate became 
negative or  just ab ove zero at  som e point in t ime. On ly t he Eur o Z one exhibits a n egative 
estimated monetary policy rate, while the effective interest rate is significantly higher than 
zero. 
  27This exercise clearly does not take into account the forward-looking nature of monetary 
policy. However, it is useful to note that the rapid deterioration in the economic environment 
called for a swift monetary policy reaction, like the one observed, and that countries reaching 
the lower bound needed significant additional monetary policy stimulus. 
 
2.2.2 Balance  Sheets 
 
For those countries that reached the lower bound and, more generally, those countries 
implementing non-conventional monetary policy actions, the interest rate is not the only, and 
perhaps not the best, aggregate indicator of monetary policy actions. In principle, an 
alternative to quantify monetary policy impulse is to look at the evolution of monetary 
aggregates. However, given that most policies implemented during this current crisis entailed 
more than simply printing money, it is probably more appropriate to look at the evolution and 
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet. Moreover, we have argued that (at least from a 
theoretical perspective) the size and composition of the central bank balance sheet can be 
relevant to dealing with lack of credibility arising at the lower bound. 
For those countries that reached a bound as they dropped policy rates, table 3 shows 
the percentage change in total assets, liabilities and capital (i.e. assets minus liabilities), 
comparing both the mean values in 2007 with those of August 2008, and the change from 
August 2008 to September 2009. Except for Australia, all these countries have increased their 
asset positions since August 2008. The mean and median of these changes reached 56% and 
20%, respectively. In addition, it also seems that after September 2008, total asset growth 
accelerated over the recent past, with the sole exception being the ECB, whose assets increased 
proportionately more in early 2008. The most dramatic increases occurred in Sweden, England 
and the US. Liabilities posted a similar, rising trend. 
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Australia -6.8  -2.9 -7.2 -3.5 0  5.5
Canada 10.6  33.7 10.4 33.9 116.8  -11.3
Chile 25  41.9 20.7 19.2 2.9  138.2
Colombia  0.8 17.9 12.3 14.7 -28.3 30.8
Euro 11  1.6 11.1 0.8 9.7  12.9
Japan  -2.7 6.4 -3 6.7 1.8 0.8
Korea  10.2 19.3 -10.8 16.6 680.5 33.1
New Zealand  12.8  18.6 -84.8 -6.3 793.5  22
Norway 6.7  18 -6.5 2.4 11.9  23.2
Sweden -0.1  240.9 -1.7 334.6 4  9
Switzerland 17.7  50.2 43.9 84.6 -4.7  5.9
England 2.7  142.8 4 146.1 -30.5  11.7
United States  1.4  139.8 0.7 145.2 18.3  26.5
Note: Data was obtained from the websites  of the different central banks. 
 
Another potentially useful measure involves central bank capital. On one hand, one can 
argue that increasing the capital level may be useful in coping with a financial crisis, for it 
might, for instance, reduce the likelihood of a run against the local currency. On the other hand, 
however, a possible way to increase the expectations about future inflation to deal with a zero 
bound situation is to increase the size of bank liabilities proportionally more than asset 
holdings: for instance, if the bank is at some point concerned with its level of capital, it will 
have incentives to produce inflation in the future. Therefore, in principle it is not clear what 
the policy recommendation should be in this sense, during a crisis like the recent one. The 
evidence presented in Table 3 suggests that central banks decided to increase the value of their 
capital after August, 2008. The only exception is Canada, whose capital has fallen by near 11%, 
although the value of its capital had more than doubled in the first part of 2008. Also Japan 
presents a mild increase in assets over liabilities (under 1%) since August, 2008. At the other 
extreme, Chile increased its capital by more than 100%, breaking a downward trend apparent 
in previous years. 
While the size of the bank’s balance sheet may be a good approximation for the 
monetary policy stance, portfolio composition offers another dimension worth considering, 
given that most unconventional policies involved buying assets that were not part of the usual 
holdings. Table 4 presents a simple breakdown of the asset side of balance sheets. For most 
countries, the table shows the shares of foreign assets, domestic credit to the government 
(mainly composed of treasury bonds) and other domestic credit. On the other hand, we present 
a different breakdown for England and the US: for England, the columns are, respectively, 
Short-term repos, Long-term repos, Bonds and others, while for the US they are Treasury 
securities, Other securities held outright (including mortgage-backed securities), and All 
Liquidity Facilities. To better understand the size of these changes, for each country the table 
displays the 2007 mean and composition in August 2008 and September 2009. 
The evidence does not show a clear pattern in the actions taken by these central banks. 
Some countries do not appear to have significantly changed the composition of their assets 
during the sample. This is the case for Japan, the Euro area and, to a lesser extent, Australia 
(which decreased its foreign assets in favor of other domestic credit in early 2008, but reversed 
the change in the latter part of the sample). For others, the change has been more dramatic. In 
  29most cases, central banks have reduced the share of foreign assets in their portfolio, except for 
Canada (which continues to hold a negligible amount of foreign assets and had increased 
domestic credit to the private sector in detriment of its government asset holdings) and 
Colombia (which has increased this weight by almost ten percentage points since 2007, 
reducing both components of domestic credit). Korea and Switzerland have increased their 
holdings of government assets proportionally more, while New Zealand, Norway and Sweden 
significantly raised domestic credit to the private sector. 
 
Table 4. Central Bank Asset Composition (share of total assets) 
                       
  Domestic Credit    Domestic Credit 
Country 
Foreign 
Assets  Government Others Country 
Foreign 
Assets  Government Others
Australia  59.2  0 39.5New  Zealand  77.7 20.2  1.8
  47.5  0 51.1  67 17.9  0
  59.8  0 38.8  61.9 12.1  25.7
Canada  *  0 95.7  3.8Norway  14.9 82.9  2
  0 96.5  0.1  10.4 85.6  1.8
  0 61.2 38.4  9.9 87.4  2.6
Chile  78 0  15.8Sweden  94.8 0 3.2
  80.5 0  11.3  97.5 0 0.6
  69.7 0  9.9  50.5 0  48.5
Colombia 74.5  3.5  11.1Switzerland  70.9  0 28.3
  85.2 0.4 3.6  59.4  0  39.8
  82.1 0.7 6.9  60.1  10.9  28.6
Euro  23.9 11.1 56.7England  **  26.3 20.9  52.8
  23.4 10.4 57.3  36.5 23.6  39.8
  20 11.9 57.7  0 17.4  82.6
Japan  4.6 65.5 28.8United  States  *** 87  0  4.1
  5 60.9 32.9  53.6  0  29.1
  4.8 58.5 35.6  35.9 38.4  21.9
Korea  93.5 4.3 2.2       
  93.6 4.6 1.7       
   83.9  10  6.1           
                       
Note: For each country the lines are, respectively, the mean for 2007, August 2008 and September 2009.  
* For Canada, Foreign assets is just foreign currency deposits.     
** For England, the columns are, respectively, Short term repos, Long term repos, and Bonds and Others.  
*** For the US, these are Treasury securities, Other securities held outright, and All Liquidity Facilities. 
 
Finally, in terms of the countries with a different breakdown, both the Fed and the 
Bank of England have drastically altered the composition of their assets. For the former, the 
shares of US treasuries decreased by more than 50 percentage points, increasing instead the 
portion devoted to other securities held overnight and liquidity facilities, which by 2007 
represented a negligible part of its portfolio. The Bank of England posted a striking reduction 
in short-term repos (to almost zero), which were replaced by a rise in bonds and other domestic 
credit. 
 
2.2.3  Monetary Condition Indexes 
 
An additional measure of monetary expansivity that we explore is the Monetary 
Condition Index (MCI), which became popular on the mid-90s for its use at the Bank of Canada 
  30and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, among others.8 The idea of this index is that the 
monetary policy stance cannot be properly captured by just looking at the monetary policy rate, 
particularly for a small, open economy, and that the real interest and exchange rates better 
summarize monetary conditions. This index is calculated as 
00 () ( 1 ) ( tt t ) MCI r r q q ω ω =− + − − , 
where    is the interest rate,    is the real exchange rate (an increase is an appreciation), 




0 r ω  is the relative weight on the real interest 
rate. 9 Therefore, a rise in the index implies a tighter monetary condition. Although the 
usefulness of this index has been subject to debate (see, for instance, Stevens, 1998, and 
Gerlach and Smets, 2000). most of the arguments for and against were based on analyzing 
“normal” times, so it is worth exploring its virtues to account for monetary conditions during a 
zero-bound period. 
 
Table 5. Monetary Condition Index (percent) 
 
              






MCI  Mean Median
Reduction 
MPR 
Australia -2.43 -0.03 -0.26 50 
Canada -1.23 -0.06 -0.11 92 
Chile -3.15 0.85 0.75 88 
Colombia -1.66 -0.45 0.2 51 
Euro -0.42 -0.05 -0.14 67 
Japan -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 80 
Korea -3.15 0.55 0.16 62 
New Zealand  -2.26 0.01 0.04 36 
Norway -1.58 0.12 -0.01 72 
Sweden -0.87 -0.14 -0.3 89 
Switzerland -1.02 0.06 -0.05 99 
England -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 90 
United States  2.41 -0.12 -0.05 88 
Note: Columns two and five are the percentage changes between 
September 2008 and September 2009. 
 
Table 5 presents the percentage change in the MCI between September 2008 and the 
same month in 2009, for each of the countries that reached a bound in their policy rate. For 
comparison, we also report the historical mean and median annual change and the observed 
reduction in the policy rate. In general, the index has fallen significantly since September 2008. 
The exceptions are the US, Japan, England and the Euro Area.10 Moreover, the size of the drop 
seems to be significantly bigger than the average size of the annual historical change in this 
coefficient, particularly in the cases of Chile, Korea, Australia and New Zealand. 
 
                                                 
8. See, for instance, Freeman (1995). 
9. These weights are a function of the importance of these variables in explaining fluctuations in output. We followed 
the implementation suggested in Bundesbank (1999). 
10. That the index does not perform properly in these countries is, in principle, not necessarily an important concern. 
As mentioned, the index was originally developed to represent the monetary stance of a small, open economy, which is 
clearly not the case here. 
  312.2.4  Comparing the Different Measures 
 
These alternative measures allow us to identify policy expansivity from different and 
relevant perspectives. A final issue that we assess is the extent to which they reflect the same 
phenomena. To answer this question, Table 6 shows the cross-country correlation between the 
observed reduction in the monetary policy rate, the drop implied by the Taylor rule (both in its 
baseline and long-run specifications), the change in total assets and liabilities, and the change 
in the share of other domestic credit and foreign assets between the average for 2007 and 
September 2009, and the difference between the percentage reduction in the policy rate implied 
by the long-run Taylor rule and the observed reduction in that rate.11,12 
 
Table 6. Correlations of Different Measures of Monetary Expansion 
 






















MPR 1     
TR 0.83  1    
LR TR  0.46  0.78 1    
Assets 0.52  0.63 0.5 1    
Liabilities 0.53  0.67 0.52 0.98 1    
Share Others  0.28  0.41 0.32 0.72 0.7 1   
Foreign Assets  -0.38  -0.57 -0.56 -0.87 -0.81 -0.61  1 
MCI 0.44  0.73 0.76 0.46 0.43 0.34  -0.57  1
LR TR - MPR  0.48  0.89 0.84 0.56 0.62 0.4 -0.58  0.78
 
The correlations between the observed drop in MPR, the changes implied by the Taylor 
rule, the change in assets and liabilities, and asset composition all have the expected sign, 
except for the Monetary Condition Index (MCI).13 In particular, we can see a high correlation 
between changes in both assets and liabilities with the reductions implied by the Taylor rule, 
and with the difference between the rule-based and observed reductions. Both indicators for 
the change in the central bank portfolio composition also seem to be related to the changes 
implied by the Taylor rule, particularly with the change in foreign assets, which has 
historically been the most important part of central bank assets.14 
 
2.3  On the Effects of Heterodox Policies 
 
As a final exercise, we present some descriptive evidence of the effects that these 
unconventional policies have had on a set of variables relevant to monetary policy transmission, 
which have remained center stage in policy discussions during the current crisis. In particular, 
we attempt to assess changes generated after policy announcements in the shape of the yield 
curve, and in lending-deposit spreads. 
We proceeded as follows. For a group of 12 central banks that reached a bound on their 
policy rates, we analyzed their press releases since mid-2007, identifying 56 policy 
announcements concerning unconventional measures.15 For each of these events, we computed 
                                                 
11. These three are comparisons between September 2008 and the last available observation. 
12. For England and the US, the items are those described in Table 4. 
13. These results for the MCI are robust if we exclude the US, Japan, England and the Euro Area. 
14. Treasuries for the U.S. and short-term repos for England. 
15 Australia, Canada, Chile, Euro Area, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, England, and the 
United States. 
  32the slope of the yield curve (based on daily data for government bonds) for the available terms, 
one week before the announcement, and one and two weeks after it, and calculated the change 
in slope.16,17 For the lending-deposit spread our data is more limited, and we computed the 
difference in the spread between its average one month before and one month after the 
announcement.18 
To analyze results, we grouped announcements in six broad categories: asset purchases 
and direct lending to financial firms, expanding list of eligible collateral, paying interest on 
reserves, swap lines with other central banks, and term loan and liquidity facilities.19 We also 
categorized the different yield curve slopes into three groups, according to the maturity of the 
longest bond in the comparison: up to six months, from six months to two years, and more than 
two years.20 The purpose of this categorization of the different slopes was to represent the short, 
medium (generally associated with the monetary policy horizon), and long runs. 
Table 7 presents the average change (across events) in the grouped tranches of the 
yield curve, for each of the categories described, and the number of events in each group.21 
While there is a significant dispersion within each group (not reported), it appears that policies 
of asset purchases and term loan and liquidity facilities generated a reduction in the medium 
part of the yield curve (between 10 and 20 basis points) while generating increases in the 
slopes at short horizons (particularly the last group). On the other hand, measures expanding 
the list of eligible collateral seem to have had an insignificant impact during the first week 
after the announcement. In addition, the creation of swap lines with other central banks 
appear to have increased the slope at terms between six month and two years, while also 
increasing the shorter part of the curve after two weeks. Finally, the two cases in our sample of 
central banks paying interest on reserves were followed by decreases in the slope at short 
terms. Overall, it seems that the effects on the longer part of the curve have been minor, on 
average. 
 
                                                 
16. Two different announcements can be part of the same event if they have occurred within two business weeks. 
17. While this is clearly not a rigorous econometric event study, given the limited size of our sample, this exercise 
would at least give us a rough idea of the impact of the announcement. A proper characterization of the causal effects 
of these policies is beyond the scope of this paper, mainly because not enough time have passed to have a relevant 
sample to attempt to measure them. 
18. The data is the average monthly rate, and for some of the more recent dates we are missing observations. 
19. A list describing each of the announcements included can be found in the appendix. 
20. Unfortunately, the same maturity structure is not available for all countries, which forced us to make this grouping 
to compare the results. 
21. A missing value in the table implies that for the country that has implemented the particular policy we do not have 
data on bonds within that particular maturity in the yield curve. 
  33Table 7. Effects of Policies in the Yield Curve and Lending-Deposits spread (average 
across events, change in basis points) 
 
                    
   Term  Structure 
Measure Type  Obs. 
Weeks 
after  Up to 6 mon.6 mon. to 2Y 2Y+ 
Lend. - 
Deposit 
12 1  7  -19  -5  4  Assets purchases and direct 
lending to financial firms   2  3  -11  -5   
Expand list of collateral  10  1  1  -1  3  5 
   2  39  2  1   
Interest on reserves  2  1  -4  6  20   
   2  -25  1     
Swap lines with other CB  6  1  -1  14  4  35 
   2  22  17  3   
26 1  15  -12  2  12.7  Term Loan and Liquidity 
Facilities     2  25  -11  2    
          
Note: For the terms structure (columns 4 to 6), the table shows the (average across observations of the) change in basis 
point in the slopes between the observation one week before the announcement of the policy and either one or two 
weeks after. For the Lending-Deposits spread (column 7), we used the change (in basis points) in the spread between 
its average one month before and one after the announcement. 
 
While the results reported in Table 7 are a good first approximation to the data, it pools 
observations for different periods in a sample that has been characterized by different levels of 
financial volatility. In an attempt to control for the different phases in the observed 
implementation of unconventional policies, we split the observation in different time frames to 
see whether these observed co-movements differ over time. 
Table 8 reports the results for three different time frames: before September 2008, 
between September and December of 2008, and after January 2009. 22 In terms of asset 
purchases, the minor reduction in the slope for the first part of the curve observed in the full 
sample contrasts with a quite important rise characterizing the three events, occurring 
between September and December of 2008, but for the other nine events the impact on the 
short part of the curve was mildly negative.23 
A similar pattern can be observed for policies that extend the list of eligible collateral. 
Before September 2008, these types of announcements were associated with reductions in the 
slope of the short part of the yield curve, while after that month this tranche of the slope 
increased after the press release. In term of policies introducing term loans and liquidity 
facilities, it seems that the flattening of the yield curve was more evident when these measures 
were implemented between September and December 2008 than after that period. 
 
 
                                                 
22. We do not show the results for policies in the group Interest on reserves because the two observations in our sample 
occurred in the same time frame (between September and December of 2008). The same is true for the categories 
missing in the next table. 
23. These number are mainly driven by the Canadian government’s announcement that it would purchase up to $25 
billion in National Housing Act Mortgage-Backed Securities. 
  34Table 8. Effects of Policies on Yield Curve and Lending-Deposits spread. Average across 
events, different time frames, change in basis points. 
                       





After  Up to 6M  6M - 2Y  2Y+ 
Lend. - 
Deposit 
1 1  -6    4  -3  Assets purchases and direct 
lending to financial firms 
Before 
Sept-08   2  -9    5   
 3  1  115  -19  -2  28 
 
Sept-08 
to Dec-08   2  70  -11  0   
 8  1  -2    -8  -5 
 
After 
Jan-09    2  -1  -8  
Expand list of collateral  2  1  -9  1  -1  -43 
 
Before 
Sept-08   2  -13  2  0   
  6  1  5 -6 4 25 
 
Sept-08 
to Dec-08   2  56  2  1   
  2  1    3 2 3 
 
After 
Jan-09   2    3  1   
Swap lines with other CB  4  1  -1  -6  7  7 
 
Sept-08 
to Dec-08   2  22  3  5   
 2  1    33  1  77 
 
After 
Jan-09   2    32  1   
1 1  15    6  61  Term Loan and Liquidity 
Facilities 
Before 
Sept-08    2  5  5  
 19  1  22  -14  3  7 
 
Sept-08 
to Dec-08   2  42  -13  2   
  6  1  1 -5 1 29 
  
After 
Jan-09     2  0  -6  -1    
 
Another potentially useful split of the sample is based on whether these policies were 
associated with different movements, depending on whether the rate had already reached its 
lower bound or not, reported in Table 9. While we can see that unconventional policies were 
mainly implemented before the central bank chose to drive the policy rate to a low value, some 
differences are still apparent. In terms of policies in the asset purchase group, it seems that 
those implemented after the lower bound was reached were associated with stronger flattening 
effects on the yield curve. On the other hand, the opposite seems to be the case for policies 
creating term loans and liquidity facilities. 
Finally, turning to the behavior of the lending-deposits spread, Table 7 shows that, on 
average, unconventional measures were followed by increases of this spread. However, the 
different time-frame breakdowns in Tables 8 and 9 reveal some exceptions. In particular, asset 
purchases seem to have been associated with increases in the spread only between September 
2008 and December 2008. Moreover, there appears to be a marked difference in the observed 
behavior of the spread, depending on whether the rate was at its lower bound or not. 
Additionally, the two announcements of expansions in the list of eligible collaterals 
implemented before September 2008 (both at the Bank of Canada), were apparently associated 
with reductions in this spread as well. Nevertheless, it is worth  repeating that the frequency of 
the data on these spreads is probably not the most suitable to analyze the effects of these types 
of events. 
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events, different time frames, change in basis points) 
                       
   Term  Structure 
   MPR Bound Obs.
Weeks 
After  Up to 6 mon. 6 mon. - 2Y  2Y+ 
Lend. - 
Deposit 
Before 4  1  -6    0  36  Assets purchases and direct 
lending to financial firms     2  -6    2   
 After  8  1  11  -19  -9  -14 
     2  7  -11  -9   
Expand list of collateral  Before  9  1  1  -1  3  5 
     2  39  2  1   
 After  1  1    3  0   
     2    3  -1   
Before 22  1  21  -14  3  14  Term Loan and Liquidity 
Facilities     2  36  -14  2   
 After  4  1  1  7  0  -3 
         2  0  6  -2    
 
Overall, it seems that announcements of Asset purchases and direct lending  and Term 
Loan and liquidity facilities produced a reduction in the slope of the yield curve over medium 
horizons; for other types, the evidence is less clear. These effects seem to have been more 
marked between September and December 2008 for both of the aforementioned categories. On 
the other hand, while the reduction in the slope generated by Asset purchases and direct 
lending was apparently stronger after the policy rate reached the lower bound, the impact of 
Term Loan and liquidity facilities was stronger before reaching the lower bound. In contrast, 
the effect on the lending-deposits spread of both types of policies was more pronounced after 





Motivated by the numerous unconventional monetary policies that have been 
implemented during the current crisis, a new wave of research in monetary policy has been 
emerged, to analyze the scope and desirability of this heterodox behavior of central banks. 
Moreover, the discussion is far from being settled and will probably keep both theorists and 
applied economists busy for years to come. 
In this context, the goals of this paper were twofold. On one hand, we provided a 
theoretical analysis of the mechanisms relevant to understanding the effects of these 
unconventional policies, and that can be used as a ground for an ex-post evaluation of the 
measures implemented. In particular, we first discussed the role of credibility in implementing 
inflationary goals, once the nominal interest rate reaches its lower bound, paying particular 
attention to the importance of the central bank’s balance sheet. In addition, we presented a 
model that has at its core a financial imperfection that highlights the role of bank capital and 
the relevance of alternative credit policies that can be used to deal with financial distress. 
We also reviewed evidence regarding the recent experience of central banks that 
implement inflation target regimes. We first described the timing and the type of 
unconventional policies that have been implemented. Second, we explored several alternative 
measures to asses the expansivity of monetary policy in a situation when the policy rate has 
reached its lower bound. Finally, we presented some descriptive evidence on the effect that the 
policies implemented had over two variables that are relevant for the propagation monetary 
policy: the shape of the yield curve and the lending-deposit spread. 
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  37A. APPENDIX 
 
A.1 Data  Sources 
 
Monetary Policy Rates: Central Banks web pages and Bloomberg; daily observations from 
January 2007 to September 2009. Monthly and quarterly averages were used for calculation 
purposes. 
 
Interest Rates and Yields: IFS, Bloomberg and Central Banks web pages. Lending and 
borrowing rates correspond to a monthly average interest rate. Yields corresponds to daily 
Nominal Government Bonds (GGR Bloomberg) 
 
GDP, CPI and Industrial Production:24 The source of this data is the IFS. All series are 
seasonally adjusted. CPI inflation corresponds to the quarterly annual percentage change in 
CPI. GDP gap is a percentage deviation from an HP trend. WTI corresponds to the average 
West Texas Intermediate oil price in current USD. RER is the real exchange rate provided by 
the IFS. NER is the nominal exchange rate provided by the IFS. CRB is the Commodity 




                                                 
24 For Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland we used quarterly data for estimation purposes. Quarterly data set 
starts in 1980q1 for Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, UK, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Sweden and USA. 
For Brazil the data set starts in 1996q4, for Czech Republic the data set starts in 1993q1, for the Euro Area 1999q1, for 
Hungary 1985q1, for Peru 1995q4, for Chile 1996q1, and for Colombia 1994q1 for Colombia. For all the countries in our 
sample the data set ends in 2009q1, except for Colombia whose data set ends in 2008q4. For monthly estimations, data 
sets start in 1980m1 for: Brazil, Canada, Denmark, UK, Japan, Korea, Norway and USA. For Switzerland the data set 
starts in 1995m1 and finishes in 2007m12, for Chile the data set starts in 1987m7, for Mexico in 1981m5, 1989m12 for 
South Africa, 1993m1 for Czech Republic, 1995m3 for Colombia, 1995m10 for Peru, 1999m1 for the Euro Area and 
1999m10 for Hungary. All the data sets ends between 2009m5 and 2009m8, except for Switzerland whose data set 
finishes in 2007m12. 
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